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Abstract: Problem statement: Because of growing demand for water resources, increasing cost of 
supplying  water  and  overdraft  of  underground  waters,  economists  suggest  water  pricing  policy  to 
improve  water  allocation  efficiency  in  Iran.  While  due  to  political  risk,  economic  and  cultural 
concerns,  government  tends  to  reject  that  advice.  This  study  addressed  questions  of  what  policy 
alternatives  to  water  pricing  could  be  used  to  improve  irrigation  water  allocation  efficiency. 
Approach: Three policy options include water pricing, water complementary input factor taxes and 
output taxes were examined. In order to minimize the problems of bias produced by fully aggregated 
models, sample farms were classified into homogeneous groups of farmers by means of clustering 
technique. The analysis carried out by means of Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP), utilizing 
quadratic cost functions. Results: Results showed that effects of alternative policies were strongly 
dependent  on  group  of  farmers  and  that  would  create  widespread  effects  on  policy  goals  across 
clusters. The results also indicated that water pricing policy worked well in reducing the irrigation 
water use when the water price level was high and will have, in most cases, higher effects than other 
policy scenarios. Conclusion: Low level of input taxation wasn't a good driver in decreasing irrigation 
water demand and keeping the welfare level. Water pricing and output tax policies were better suited 
and effective than water complementary input factor taxation but both input factor tax and output tax 
policy at certain rates could be alternatives to water pricing policy. Water pricing policy had noticeable 
effects on social and environmental goals, while input and output taxes had small effects on that goals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  Water  scarcity  and  its  impacts  on  agricultural 
production  and  food  security  are  growing  concerns 
worldwide. Increasingly, water scarcity is described as 
a  major  challenge  facing  Iran,  an  arid  and  semiarid 
country, with an average annual precipitation (250 mm) 
which is less than one-third of the world average. In 
Iran,  irrigated  agriculture  is  responsible  for  89%  of 
agricultural production, with only 52% of the cultivated 
area -6.7 million ha-consuming 90% of the total water 
supply
[20].  Overdraft  of  groundwater  resources  has 
caused negative balance of groundwater and out of 612 
plains  of  the  country,  150  plains  are  restricted.  At 
present,  pricing  irrigation  water  is  based  on  the  so 
called equitable distribution law of 1988. According to 
this  law,  surface  water  charges  are  based  on  some 
percentage of the value of output (output pricing). Since 
this system of pricing is not based on the volume of 
water delivered, it lacks the incentive for efficient use 
of  irrigation  water.  In  the  case  of  groundwater 
resources,  price  is  between  0.25-1.0%  of  the 
commercial value of crop yield. Irrigation water in Iran 
is heavily subsidized. It has been estimated that, water 
charges in public irrigation schemes only cover 12% of 
the  supply  cost
[4].  Limitations  of  development  water 
resources,  apparently  poor  management  and  large 
losses  of  water  in  Iranian  irrigated  areas  compel  the 
implementation  of  demand  water  policies.  Such 
demand policies consist in the main of the public re-
allocation  of  water  resources,  water  pricing  and 
alternative  irrigation  policies  such  as  water 
complementary input factor taxes and output taxes
[6,11]. 
  Using empirical evidence from Iran to assess the 
effectiveness  of  water  pricing  in  curtailing  demand, 
Perry
[2,13,17,23] have estimated a 10, 3.5, 3 and 10 fold 
increase for irrigation water prices in different regions, 
respectively. It concerns the low farmer responsiveness Am. J. Agri. & Biol. Sci., 4 (3): 206-214, 2009 
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at observed prices ranges. Therefore agricultural water 
prices  need  to  be  raised  significantly  or  introducing 
alternative  irrigation  policies.  The  implementation  of 
these  economic  instruments  would  produce  collateral 
effects, such as a decrease in agricultural income and a 
reduction  in  the  demand  for  agricultural  labor.  The 
solution to get rid of water scarcity is to improve water 
allocation and concentrate on the integrated water and 
land  management,  emphasizing  on  the  agricultural 
water management
[8,23]. The objectives of this research 
are to evaluate alternative policy options to see if and 
how well they can serve as a proxy of  water pricing 
policy in study area and to analyze the potential impacts 
on cropping pattern, irrigation water demand, welfare, 
labor employment and environment for each alternative 
strategic policy. In sum, knowing the farmers response 
to these new policies will indeed illuminate the decision 
making process of policy choice to attain the desired 
goals of reducing water demand and alleviating water 
scarcity. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
  The  methodology  is  intended  to  simulate  the 
impact of alternative water policy scenarios, based on 
the  following steps: (1) representative farms (RFs); 
(2) The Model; (3) Definition of water policy scenarios; 
(4) simulation of responses. 
 
Representative  farms:  As  the  economic  and  social 
characteristics of farms, vary from farm to farm within 
region,  the  same  policy  instruments  can  lead  to 
extremely  different  results.  Consequently,  policy-
makers need to preliminarily know the effects that the 
new policies can induce on the homogeneous groups of 
farmers.  The  aim  is  to  identify  farms  with 
homogeneous  characteristics  with  respect  to  the 
production activities, to the resources usage and to the 
economic  features of study area. The cluster analysis 
was  intended  to  gather  farms  within  relatively 
homogeneous  groups  in  order  to  account  for 
heterogeneity between groups of farms
[7,9]. To construct 
the PMP models, a random sample of 172 farmers was 
selected from the Mashhad plain in Khorasan province 
of  Iran.  Data  were  obtained  from  sample  farmers  by 
way  of  structured  questionnaire  and  personal 
interviews. It is necessary to assess the relevance of the 
variables to the problem being investigated and use the 
factor analysis to remove highly correlated variables
[1]. 
In the next stage, to avoid aggregation bias, we used 
classification  variables  for  any  individual  farm  (net 
income  and  resource  use  per  hectare,  endowment  of 
different resources) which were acquired from previous  
Table 1: Basic data per representative farm  
  Cluster number   
  ---------------------------------------------- 
Characteristics  1  2  3  4  Average 
Area (ha)  485.0  2349.0  369.00  276.0  - 
No. of farms  35.0  63.0  37.00  21.0  - 
Average farm  13.9  37.3  10.00  13.1  18.6 
size (ha) 
Gross margin  6.5  19.6  21.10  12.2  14.8 
(10
6 Rials* ha
-1) 
Land/labor ratio  1.49  0.35  0.06  0.10  0.5 
(ha man-day
-1) 
Irrigation water  5096.00  4429.0  5761.00  4663.00  - 
(m
3 ha
-1) 
Price of water  217.00  296.0  336.00  629.00  369.0 
(Rials m
-3) 
Notes: *: Official exchange rate is 9500 Rials = 1 US dollar 
 
stage  to  construct  RFs.  Considering  classification 
variables  reveals  that  these  variables  almost  conform 
with Day's aggregation conditions
[7]. RFs were selected 
on  the  basis  of  Hierarchical  cluster  analysis  and 
clustering  was  performed  using  the  Ward's  minimum 
variance criterion as the clustering method and squared 
Euclidean  distance  as  measure.  The  hierarchical  tree 
(dendrogram)  showed  the  appropriate  number  of 
clusters for this sample as four. The main descriptive 
statistics for each cluster are shown in Table 1. 
  The farms in cluster 2 with an average farm size of 
37.3  ha,  are  larger  than  other  farms  while  farms  in 
cluster 3 have smallest size with an average farm size 
13.1 ha. Both clusters 2 and 3 include farms with the 
highest Gross margin per hectare, but cluster 3 consists 
of 37 farms with lower acreage and cluster 2 consists of 
63 farms with highest acreage. Farms in clusters 3 and 
4  also  have  on  average  the  smallest  land/labor  ratio, 
compared  to  farms  from  the  other  two  clusters.  It  is 
likely that these farms have a larger number of labors 
per hectare and so called, production process in these 
farms compared to farms from clusters 1 and 2 is labor 
intensive.  Comparing  total  available  irrigation  water 
and total acreage per cluster indicates that on average, 
farms in the first and the third clusters use higher rates 
of water per hectare than the first and the second groups 
of farms. In other words, first and the third groups of 
farmers  planted  water-intensive  crops  and  two  other 
groups  grow  crops  with  low  water  requirement.  For 
each  group  of  farmers  price  of  water  and  water 
consumption per hectare has similar behavior, so that 
from  first  to  fourth  cluster  price  of  water  and  water 
consumption per hectare increases.  
 
Model:  The  study  uses  an  extended  version  of  the 
standard  PMP  model  calibration  approach
[14].  Once 
homogeneous groups of farmers (clusters, or RFs), have 
been defined, the second stage builds the mathematical Am. J. Agri. & Biol. Sci., 4 (3): 206-214, 2009 
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models. The modeling analyses will be presented, based 
on results of four models, developed for sample farms. 
In order to allow independent simulations based on the 
decision-making  behavior  of  the  various  groups  of 
farmers  to  be  run,  each  cluster  has  been  modeled 
separately. For this purpose, the basic elements of any 
mathematical model; i.e., decision variables, objective 
function and set of constraints, have to be outlined. The 
PMP calibration method adopted in this model utilises a 
non-linear cost function and a CES production function 
for each production activity. The value of each variable 
per cluster is an average of individual farms included in 
that cluster. Since the publication of a comprehensive 
study  on  PMP  in  agricultural  policy  models  by 
Howitt
[14],  this  calibration  approach  has  become  a 
standard  methodology  and  has  been  employed  in 
various models at farm
[5,16], regional
[3,10,18,22]) and sector 
level
[19].  A  farm  level  and  multi-crop  program  is 
proposed  for  this  study  following  Howitt
[14,15].  The 
approach  adopted  can  be  divided  into  three  different 
stages: (1) The construction of a usual linear program 
model with calibration constraints, (2) The use of the 
resulting dual values to calibrate the parameters of the 
nonlinear  objective  function  (3)  The  simulation  of 
agricultural policy changes. In stage (1), we consider 
the following Linear Program (LP): 
 
i i i j ij i
i j
max     Z p y x a x    = - w ∑ ∑   (1) 
 
  Subject to: 
 
] [ b Ax 1 l £   (2) 
 
] [ x x 2 0 l e + £   (3) 
 
x 0 ³   (4) 
 
Z   =  the objective function value 
P and ω =  Represent the price per unit for output i and 
accounting  costs  per  unit  of  input  j, 
respectively 
x  =  the non-negative vector of surface cultivated 
with production i 
i y    =  Indicates  the  production  yield  in  the 
reference year 
 
  Equation 2 and 3 denote the resource constraints 
and calibration constraints, respectively. A is matrix of 
technical  coefficients  in  resource  constraints  with  aij 
elements.  b  shows  the  vector  of  available  resource 
levels and x0 is non-negative vector of observed activity 
levels. ε represents the vector of small positive numbers 
for preventing linear dependency between the structural 
constraints and the calibration constraints. In addition to 
dual values for the limiting allocable resources (λ1), this 
constrained program generates dual values (λ2) for each 
activity except for the marginal activity. 
  In the first stage, calibration constraints are added 
to the initial base-year linear program to, binding the 
activities  to  the  observed  levels  of  the  baseline. 
Howitt
[14]  and  Paris  and  Howitt
[21]  interpret  the  dual 
variable  vector  l2,  associated  with  the  calibration 
constraints  as  capturing  any  type  of  model  mis-
specification, data errors, aggregate bias, risk behavior 
and price expectations. Graindorge et al.
[10] attributed 
dual  variable  vector  l2  to  heterogeneous  land  or 
livestock  quality.  In  the  perspective  of  calibrating  a 
non-linear  decreasing  yield  function  as  in  Howitt
[14], 
this  l2  represents  the  difference  between  the  activity 
average and marginal value products. In the alternative 
perspective of calibrating a non-linear increasing cost 
function as in Paris and Howitt
[21], this dual vector l2 is 
interpreted  as  a  differential  marginal  cost  vector  that 
together  with  the  activity  accounting  cost  vector  ω 
reveals the actual variable marginal cost of supplying 
the observed activity vector xo. 
  In the second stage, marginal values (dual values) 
from the previous stage are used along with the base-
year  data  set  to  calculate  parameters  needed  by  a 
quadratic cost function and a CES production function. 
These functions together form a nonlinear program that 
produces  the  base  year  solution  without  calibration 
constrains.  In  this  stage  the  dual  values  calibrate  the 
parameters  of  the  nonlinear  objective  function.  For 
reasons of computational simplicity and lacking strong 
arguments for other type of functions a quadratic cost 
function  is  usually  employed  in  the  objective 
function
[12].  However  any  type  of  nonlinear  function 
with the required properties is acceptable to this step. 
The general version of this variable cost function for 
each crop, as quadratic in the acreage allocated to the 
crop, to be specified is: 
 
v 1
C d'x x'Qx
2
= +   (5) 
 
Where: 
d  =  Denotes vector of parameters associated with the 
linear term  
Q  =  A  symmetric,  positive  semi  definite  matrix  of 
parameters associated with the quadratic term 
 
  The parameters are then specified so that the linear 
marginal  variable  cost  functions  (MC
v)  for  different 
crops fulfill: Am. J. Agri. & Biol. Sci., 4 (3): 206-214, 2009 
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v 0
v 0
2
C (x )
MC d Qx
x
¶
= = + = w+l
¶
  (6) 
 
  To solve this system of n equation for n crop, PMP 
modelers  rely  on  various  solutions.  Judez  et  al.
[16] 
directly  derived  the  unknown  parameters  of  the  final 
non-linear  model  from  the  Kuhn-Tucker  conditions. 
Paris  and  Howitt
[21]  exploited  the  maximum  entropy 
estimator to determine all elements of the vector d and 
matrix  Q  using  the  Cholesky  factorization  while, 
Paris
[22]  generalized  the  PMP  framework  into  a 
Symmetric  Positive  Equilibrium  Problem.  Among 
them,  the  average  cost  approach  used  in  this  study 
which  equates  the  accounting  cost  vector  ω  to  the 
average cost vector of the quadratic cost function and 
leads to: 
 
ii 2 0 i i 2 q 2 / x  and d   for all i 1, ...n = l = w -l =   (7) 
 
where, qii denote the n diagonal elements of matrix Q. 
By  using  the  prior  information,  technology  is 
represented  by  a  CES  production  function,  which 
allows input substitution among production factors. The 
CES production function is usually written as: 
 
n
1
j j
j 1
y ( .X )
g g
=
= a b ∑   (8) 
 
Where: 
y  = An output 
Xj = An input 
α  = Scale (yield) parameter  
bj  = Share parameter 
 
  The CES share and scale parameters are estimated 
according  to  Howitt
[15]  by  using  the  first-order 
conditions  for  input  allocation.  Details  of  estimation 
appear  in  Howitt
[15].  The  substitution  parameter  γ  is 
related to the elasticity of substitution σ by the relation 
σ = 1/ (1-γ). Where g = (s-1)/s, ∑ = b 1 j  and σ is prior 
value elasticity of substitution. The elasticity of input 
substitution coefficient of the CES function (Eq. 8) is 
derived from empirical sources. In the third stage, the 
derived cost parameters and the base-year data set are 
used to specify a non-linear program that includes the 
original  constraints  except  the  calibration  constraints. 
Formally,  the  calibration  stages  lead  to  the  following 
model structure adapted from Howitt
[14]: 
 
max      p y d x  x Qx / 2    ¢ ¢ ¢ p = - -   (9) 
 
  Subject to: 
y f(x) =   (10) 
 
] [ b Ax 1 l £   (11) 
 
x 0 ³   (12) 
 
  Equation  9  maximizes  Total  Net  Revenue  (TNI) 
corresponds to a farm group, while Eq. 11 and 12 are 
constraint sets for production factors. The first term in 
Eq. 9 shows the total revenue and the two last terms in 
Eq.  9  form  a  quadratic  cost  function.  This  calibrated 
model can be used for policy change simulations. The 
models  were  solved  and  developed  using  solver 
MINOS, run over GAMS as the optimization software. 
 
Definition  of  water  policy  scenarios:  In  order  to 
simulate  the  impacts  of  various  policy  scenarios  we 
employed water price, input and output policies related 
to  water  use.  As  indicated  in  Table  2,  three  policy 
scenarios were simulated using PMP models: (1) Water 
pricing  policy;  (2)  An  input  tax  policy;  and  (3)  An 
output  tax  policy.  Each  scenario  has  multiple  sub-
scenarios.  The  water  pricing  scenario  observes  the 
effects  under  different  irrigation  water  pricing  levels. 
The first price level (W1) is 100% increase in current 
water price. The second and third price levels (W2 and 
W3)  are  100%  increase  in  water  price  levels  plus 
changing the irrigation water constraint to less than the 
binding level by 10 and 20%, respectively.  Changing 
price of nitrogen fertilizer (N-fertilizer) and fungicide 
affects  on  crop  production  costs  and  consequently 
changes welfare, irrigation water demand and cropping 
patterns. The tax rates for these resources are at 25 (I1) 
and 50% (I2). The output tax scenario taxes sugar beet 
and tomato production since these crops are irrigation 
water intensive among all other crops in study area. An 
output tax is a price cut on the producer side at 10 (O1) 
and 20% (O2) which could take the form of reducing 
the subsidies on corresponding crops.  
  The models were developed in order to derive the 
results of the policy simulation which are presented in 
four categories: 
 
Economic  impacts:  are  measured  by  percentage 
change in TNI.  
 
Water  conservation:  The  projected  consumption  of 
water measured in m
3 ha
-1, is the variable that policy 
makers  wish  to  control  via  different  policy  options. 
Water conservation is measured by the decreasing rate 
of  demand  for  irrigation  water  after  implementing  a 
certain policy.  Am. J. Agri. & Biol. Sci., 4 (3): 206-214, 2009 
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Table 2: Description of policy scenarios in Mashhad plain 
Scenarios  Water pricing policy  Input tax policy  Output tax policy 
-------------------  -------------------------  ----------------------------- -------------------------- 
 Sub-scenarios Wl  W2  W3  n-fertilizer Fungicide  Sugar beet  Tomato 
 Water pricing  *  *  * 
Input tax        *    * 
Output tax              *    * 
 
Land  reallocation:  Variation  in  level  of  activities  is 
measured as an indicator of reallocating land input to 
different crops in response to enforced policies. 
 
Social impact: irrigated agriculture is the main source 
of employment in study area. We expect that changes in 
policy  rules  could  affect  the  social  structure  of  this 
region. This phenomenon can be evaluated via changes 
in agricultural Labor use.  
 
Environmental  impact:  An  environmental  effect  of 
growing relevance is the pollution caused by the use of 
agrochemicals in agriculture. The percentage change in 
consumption of N-fertilizer and fungicide are taken as 
indicators of the environmental impact of agricultural 
activities that caused by the policy options. 
 
Area  of  study:  The  practical  application  of  the 
methodology proposed above is based on the community 
of irrigators of the Mashhad plain in Northeast of Iran. 
The climate in the area is typically dry with an annual 
average precipitation of 203 mm. In this area, agriculture 
faced  with  over-exploitation  and  critical  conditions  of 
groundwater aquifers so that there is a difference of 
1.06 bcm between recharge of water resources (8.6 bcm) 
and discharges from them (9.66 bcm) in Mashhad plain.  
 
RESULTS 
 
  This  section  analyses  the  results  obtained  from 
solving  PMP  models  simulating  alternative  scenarios. 
Model  runs  for  each  RF  and  policy  alternative  were 
performed  by  using  GAMS  as  the  optimization 
software.  Results  include  water  conservation,  land 
reallocation,  economic,  social  and  environmental 
impacts. 
 
Economic impact: The percentage change in welfare 
from its base level is reported in Table 3. Results from 
policy scenarios simulation indicate that water pricing 
policy scenarios have the greatest negative impact on 
TNI  of  RFs.  while  input  tax  policies  function  at  the 
opposite state and have a negligible negative effect on 
TNI.  The  fall  in  total  welfare  ranges  between  0  and 
55% of the current TNI, depending on the cluster. A 
reduction in welfare is the lowest with the cluster 2, i.e., 
the  farms  with  highest  farm  size  and  the  lowest 
Irrigation  water  consumption  per  hectare.  Alternative 
policies,  especially  water  pricing  policies,  had 
significantly decreased welfare level related to 4
th RF. 
Since  Farms  in  4th  RF  experience  the  highest  water 
price, there is a slight difference between current and 
shadow  water  price  with  this  group  of  farms.  The 
results show that change in welfare vary across RFs and 
alternative  policies  so  that  different  pricing  policies 
produce clear differential effects on the irrigation farms 
of study area. W2 and W3 policies have larger effects 
on welfare than W1 policy. Input tax policy has small 
effects  than  water  pricing  and  output  tax  policy 
scenarios  on  farmers'  total  welfare.  Both  input  and 
output  tax  policies  have  inappreciable  effect  at  farm 
level. N-fertilizer tax affects crop production costs and 
therefore production decisions. However, until the tax 
rate of N-fertilizer increases by more than 50% we do 
not see appreciable changes in reduction of welfare.  
  In  the  fungicide  tax  scenario,  changing  the 
fungicide cost has limited effects on the welfare level. 
When fungicide costs increase 50%, the welfare level 
decreases  by  less  than  0.1%  (ranges  between  0  and 
0.07%).  Twenty  five  percent  of  output  tax  (O1)  will 
decrease level of welfare more than the I1 and I2 level, 
while output tax at 50% (O2) decreased more welfare 
than O1. It is necessary to emphasize that the effect on 
farmers`  welfare  would  be  quite  different  in  the  four 
clusters considered. This decrease in the profitability of 
irrigated  agriculture,  especially  as  a  result  of  water 
pricing  interventions,  might  well  lead  in  to  the 
withdrawal  of  a  large  percentage  of  farmers  from 
agriculture. 
Table 3: Reductions in total welfare (%) 
        Input tax policy      Output tax policy 
        ---------------------------------------------------  ------------------------------------------------------------ 
  Water pricing policy    n-fertilizer    Fungicide    Sugar beet    Tomato 
  -----------------------------------  -----------------------  ---------------------  ------------------------  --------------------------- 
Model No.  Wl  W2  W3  I1  I2  I1  I2  O1  O2  O1  O2 
(1)  7.1  11.8  11.8  0.01  0.04  0.02  0.07  0.60  0.80  1.13  1.13 
(2)  5.8  11.0  11.0  0.04  0.11  0.01  0.02  0.06  0.06  2.40  4.40 
(3)  6.5  12.5  12.5  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.04  2.70  5.00  5.00  9.00 
(4)  28.0  53.0  55.0  0.10  0.30  0.00  0.00  3.80  10.00  2.00  1.50 Am. J. Agri. & Biol. Sci., 4 (3): 206-214, 2009 
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Table 4: Water conservation in different scenarios (%) 
        Input tax policy      Output tax policy 
        -------------------------------------------------------  ------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Water pricing policy    n-fertilizer    Fungicide    Sugar beet    Tomato 
  -------------------------------------- -----------------------  ------------------------  --------------------------  --------------------------- 
Model No.  Wl  W2  W3  I1  I2  I1  I2  O1  O2  O1  O2 
(1)  330  64.0  64.0  -  -  -  -  -  16.4  -  - 
(2)  240  34.0  34.0  4.0  4.0  3.90  4.00  13  13.0  2.4  2.4 
(3)  8.8  17.6  19.7  0.2  0.2  0.18  0.18  5  9.0  2.9  5.0 
(4)  -  8.0  16.0  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
 
Table 5: Water pricing effects on cropping pattern 
    Cluster 2        Cluster 3 
  --------------------------------------------------------------  --------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Percentage change from base     Percentage change from base   
    -----------------------------------------    -------------------------------------------- 
Water pricing scenario  Base (ha)  W1  W2  W3  Base (ha)  W1  W2  W3 
Wheat  156.0  -4.0  -8  -8  41.0  +0.1  +0.3  +0.3 
RF-wheat  1401.0  +0.4  +1  +1  105.0  +20.0  +50.0  +50.0 
Barley  18.0  -18.0  -35  -35  69.0  -10.0  -54.0  -54.0 
RF-barley  75.0  +7.0  +11  +11  19.0  +1.0  +3.0  +3.0 
RF-chickpea  -  -  -  -  4.5  -100.0  -100.0  -100.0 
Sugar beet  17.0  -100.0  -100  -100  44.0  -21.0  -23.0  -23.0 
Potato  19.5  -0.3  -1  -1  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Onion  -  -  -  -  5.5  -1.0  -2.5  -2.5 
Tomato  45.0  -3.0  -9  -9  55.0  0.0  -2.0  -2.0 
 
Water  conservation:  Water  conservation  is  measured 
by  the  decreasing  rate  of  demand  for  irrigation  water 
after implementing a certain policy, as shown in Table 4. 
Water  pricing  policy  works  well  in  reducing  the 
irrigation  water  use  in  the  Mashhad  plain  when  the 
water  price  level  is  high.  Water  pricing  interventions 
result a reduction in demand for irrigation water up to 
64%. When the water price level is twice as much as 
current shadow price (W1), this policy would lead to a 
significant reduction in the quantity of water demanded 
by  different  group  of  farmers.  The  reduction  mainly 
comes  from  Sugar  beet,  Potato  and  tomato.  Since 
current low  water prices  for all farms coincided  with 
high shadow prices, raising water price to W1, W2 and 
W3 levels, lead to prices  higher than current  shadow 
prices and consequently result significant reduction in 
water demanded at farm level. Inputs tax will affect the 
cropping decision and hence the demand for irrigation 
water. However, until the price of N-fertilizer increases 
up  to  50%,  there  are  no  appreciable  changes  in 
reduction of irrigation water use, especial in the case of 
1st and 4th RFs. When the N-fertilizer tax increases by 
25 and 50%, the demand for irrigation water decreases 
by a similar percentage in the case of 2nd and 3rd RFs, 
while  in  the  case  of  two  other  RFs  irrigation  water 
demand  still  remains  fixed.  In  the  fungicides  tax 
scenario,  changing  the  fungicides  cost  has  similar 
impact  on  irrigation  water  demand  as  N-fertilizer  tax 
policy so that these two policies could be an alternative 
option for each other in reducing demand for irrigation 
water.  Taxation  on  sugar  beet  and  tomato  production 
decreases  irrigation  water  demand  as  expected.  The 
main  contributions  to  irrigation  water  reduction  are 
from sugar beet and tomato. At the 25% tax rate, the 
demand for irrigation water falls by 13 and 5% in the 
case of RF (2) and (3), respectively. At this tax level, 
demand for irrigation water remains fixed in the case of 
two other RFs. Taxation on sugar beet lead to higher 
planted area of tomato and vice versa. Thus an effective 
output  tax  policy  that  follows  irrigation  water 
conservation  must  comprise  taxation  on  both  crops 
simultaneously.  Altogether,  Water  pricing  and  output 
tax  policies  have  more  influence  on  water  demand 
while input tax policy remains inefficient. 
 
Land  reallocation:  The  base  cropping  area  for  each 
crop  (in  hectare)  and  the  percentage  change  from  its 
base  level  are  reported  in  Table  5.  Since  input  and 
output taxation didn't have substantial effect on input's 
demand  in  the  case  of  RF  (1)  and  RF  (4)  and  for 
simplicity, cropping pattern changes shown only for RF 
(2) and (3). The cropping area decreased for almost all 
major crops except rain-feed crops, as the price of water 
increased. Because of its high water requirement, sugar 
beet excludes from cropping pattern in the case of RF 
(2). When the W2 water pricing level implemented, the 
changes of cropping patterns are almost the same as at 
the  W3  level.  From  the  perspective  of  cropping 
patterns,  the  most  affected  crop  is  sugar  beet  which 
only  uses  less  than  1  and  13%  of  the  total  irrigation Am. J. Agri. & Biol. Sci., 4 (3): 206-214, 2009 
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water at the base level in the case of RF (2) and (3), 
respectively. The production of rain-feed crops, such as 
rain-feed  wheat  and  rain-feed  barely,  increases  up  to 
50% along with the increasing water price.  
 
Social  impact:  Performing  the  cited  scenarios  would 
lead to changes in the employment, as shown in Table 6. 
The decrease in farm labor is a social impact caused by 
substitution of the most water intensive crops such as 
sugar beet, potato and tomato, which are normally also 
more labor-intensive, by others with reduced water and 
labor requirements. These changes in farm labor depend 
on the farmers' behavior and range from reduction by 
16% in current labor demand (RF 3 for O2 scenario) to 
an increase by 0.24% (RF 3 for I2 scenario) in current 
labor  demand.  Farm  operations  in  the  study  area  are 
based  on  family  labor  with  little  hired  labor.  So, 
changes  in  demand  for  labor  would  basically  be 
translated  into  changes  in  farmers’  leisure.  A  slight 
change happens with demand for labor as the input tax 
policy implemented. There exist a variety of responses 
to other policies among different groups of farmers. So 
that output taxes, lead to lower employment level than 
water  pricing  policies.  After  performing  a  scenario, 
farmers  change  use  of  labor  but  after  labor's 
redistribution,  total  employed  labor  remains  fixed. 
Taxation on sugar beet causes transferring of labors to 
tomato production and vice versa. Consequently, total 
labor employed in farm remains unchanged. 
 
Environmental impact: The introduction of irrigation 
water pricing and output taxation would also reduce N-
fertilizer consumption, as shown in Table 7. Crops such 
as  onion,  tomato  and  sugar  beet  with  high  water 
requirements have higher requirements for N-fertilizer 
and fungicides than others with lower irrigation needs. 
The results have shown that in the case of RFs 1 and 4, 
the system is basically stable and able to match most of 
the  scenarios  without  any  change  in  the  total 
consumption of N-fertilizer and fungicides. So Table 7 
includes only environmental impacts in the case of RFs 
2  and  3.  As  water  price  increases  farmers  with  high 
rates of water utilization per hectare (RF 2 and RF 3), 
reduce consumption level of N-fertilizer significantly, 
while others are not induced to change their N-fertilizer 
consumption level. Again, the impact of different input 
tax policies on N-fertilizer consumption appears to be 
negligible.  Output  taxation  may  increases  the  N-
fertilizer  consumption  by  some  crops,  but  total  N-
fertilizer consumption remains fixed or decreases. 
  Although, fungicide accounts for a small portion of 
production  cost,  results  shown  that  alternative  policy 
options  have  noticeable  effect  on  fungicide 
consumption and consequently are efficient policies for 
reducing  usage  of  this  input  (Table  8).  Sugar  beet, 
potato and tomato have a much higher application rate 
of fungicide than other crops. Therefore a fungicide tax 
decreases the cropping area of these crops that finally 
results reduction in fungicide consumption.  
Table 6: Changes in employment (%) 
        Input tax policy      Output tax policy 
        ---------------------------------------------------------  ------------------------------------------------- 
  Water pricing policy    n-fertilizer    Fungicide    Sugar beet   Tomato 
  --------------------------------------  -----------------------  -------------------------  ---------------------  -------------------- 
Model No.  Wl  W2  W3  I1  I2  I1  I2  O1  O2  O1  O2 
(1)   -1.40   -1.40   -1.4  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
(2)   -3.60   -3.60  -3.6   -3.70   -3.70   -3.70   -3.70   -3.8   -3.70   -3.7   -3.60 
(3)  -2.80  -11.80  -5.4  +0.30  +0.27  +0.27  +0.24  -6.0  -9.60  -9.3  -16.00 
(4)  -0.08  -0.08  -9.0  -0.08  -0.08  -  -  -0.08  -0.08  -  -0.08 
 
Table 7: Reduction in N-fertilizer utilization (%) 
        Input tax policy        Output tax policy 
        ------------------------------------------------------  ------------------------------------------------  
  Water pricing policy    n-fertilizer    Fungicide    Sugar beet   Tomato 
  -----------------------------------  -----------------------  --------------------  -------------------  ------------------- 
Model No.  Wl  W2  W3  I1  I2  I1  I2  O1  O2  O1  O2 
(2)   4.13   6.3   6.0   1.40   1.60   1.6   1.40   1.4   1.4   1.4   1.4 
(3)  5.80  11.8  12.2   0.11  0.14  0.1  0.11  4.5  8.3  2.6  4.8 
 
Table 8: Reduction in fungicide in different scenarios (%) 
        Input tax policy      Output tax policy 
        --------------------------------------------------------  ------------------------------------------------ 
  Water pricing policy    n-fertilizer    Fungicide    Sugar beet   Tomato 
  ----------------------------------  ------------------------  -----------------------  --------------------  -------------------- 
Model No.  Wl  W2  W3  I1  I2  I1  I2  O1  O2  O1  O2 
(2)  5.5  10.0  10.0  1.02  1.10  1.00  1.03  0.3  0.3  4.0  6.9 
(3)  2.0  5.4  5.4  0.12  0.14  0.02  0.06  2.5  5.0  13.4  25.0 Am. J. Agri. & Biol. Sci., 4 (3): 206-214, 2009 
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DISCUSSION 
 
  This  research  intended  to  provide  a  better 
understanding  of  alternative  irrigation  policies 
compared  to  water  pricing  by  examining  irrigation 
policy  options  for  the  Mashhad  plain  in  Iran.  Two 
important conclusions can be drawn from this research. 
From  the  methodological  point  of  view,  is  worth 
emphasizing  the  advantages  of  cluster  analysis  and 
PMP methods. Indeed, from the policy making point of 
view, water pricing policy performs more effective than 
input and output tax policy to reduce irrigation water 
demand  and  conserve  water.  The  actual  behavior 
patterns  vary  significantly  when  specific  groups  of 
irrigators (clusters) are studied.  
  By  comparing  the  change  from  base  level,  the 
model  results  show  that  increasing  irrigation  water 
price has large effects on welfare at farm level while 
certain rates of input and output taxes can decrease the 
demand for irrigation water and welfare level a bit. In 
addition, input tax policy has small effects than water 
pricing  and  output  tax  policy  scenarios  on  farmers' 
welfare.  The  input  tax  policy  was  not  an  effective 
policy  in  this  study.  In  other  words,  N-fertilizer  and 
fungicide  are  not  a  close  complement  to  irrigation 
water. The comparisons also indicate that input taxes 
and output tax at higher level could be as an alternative 
option for water pricing. Taxation on sugar beet lead to 
higher planted area of tomato and vice versa. Output tax 
on  tomato  and  sugar  beet  could  be  used  to  reduce 
irrigation water demand on these two crops. This would 
promote  cultivation  of  less  water  intensive  but 
profitable  crops  such  as  cereals.  Cropping  patterns 
changed appreciably for water pricing policies. While 
input tax and output tax policies were not effective in 
changing  cropping  pattern  and  had  limited  effects  on 
the cropping pattern. Results indicate that cultivation of 
sugar beet, potato and tomato decrease more than less 
water  intensive  crops.  Output  taxes,  lead  to  lower 
employment  level  than  water  pricing  policies  but  a 
slight  change  happens  with  demand  for  labor  as  the 
input tax policy implemented. Impact of different input 
tax policies on N-fertilizer consumption appears to be 
negligible.  
CONCLUSION 
 Water  pricing  policy  works  well  in  reducing  the 
irrigation water use when the water price level is high 
and will have, in most cases, higher effects than other 
policy scenarios. As water price increases farmers with 
low  rates  of  water  utilization  per  hectare  reduce 
consumption  level  of  N-fertilizer  significantly,  while 
others  are  not  induced  to  change  their  N-fertilizer 
consumption level. Low level of input taxation should 
not be used if the policy goal is to limit irrigation water. 
A fungicide tax may not be a good driver in decreasing 
irrigation water demand and keeping the welfare level 
similar. Water pricing and output tax policies are better 
suited  and  effective  than  water  complementary  input 
factor taxation. 
  However, Policy scenario outcomes in reality will 
not  be  as  smooth  as  in  our  results.  It  is  worth 
remembering  that  achieving  the  positive  impacts 
discussed here would require an appropriate legal and 
social  framework.  Since  irrigation  water  in  Iran 
historically and legally has been regarded as a common 
good and  most  farmers still  believe that price of this 
resource  should  not  increased,  a  slow  evolution  of 
farmers'  mentality  is  required,  in  the  direction  of 
regarding water as an economic good and rising price 
of this scarce resource. 
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